A feature-matching model to account for the effects of novelty and significance on psychophysiological responsivity is presented. 2 experiments based on a modified version of the Guilty Knowledge Technique were designed to test predictions derived from the proposed model. Results of Experiment 1 demonstrated that electrodermal responsivity to the test stimulus reflected the degree to which the subjects were habituated to its components. Experiment 2 provided additional support for the proposed model and suggested that the effects of novelty and significance were additive. These findings support the hypothesis that responsivity is positively related to the degree of match between the input and the representation of significance, and it is negatively related to the similarity between the input and the preceding stimuli. It is argued that the proposed model clarifies the processes involved in orienting response elicitation.
Orientation processes play an important role in attention and facilitate information processing (e.g., Kahneman, 1973; Ohman, 1979; Pribram & McGuinness, 1975; Sokolov, 1963 Sokolov, , 1966 . The concept of the orienting reflex was originally introduced by Pavlov (1927) to describe the reflex that brings about an immediate response to the slightest change in the environment. According to Sokolov (1963 Sokolov ( , 1966 , repeated presentations of a given stimulus result in an internal representation of that stimulus input. This representation, which Sokolov termed the neuronal model, contains the parameters of the stimulus. All input information is compared with the existing neuronal models; a mismatch between stimulus input and the models will result in an orientation reaction. If the input matches the existing models, the orienting response (OR) will be inhibited. Sokolov's approach led to extensive research that in general produced confirmatory results (e.g., Gorman, 1967; Zimny & Schwabe, 1965) , although some discrepancies were also observed (e.g., Barry, 1982; Furedy, 1968) .
A major controversial issue revolves around the necessary and sufficient conditions for orientation. The conventional interpretation of Pavlov's (1927) and Sokolov's (1963) conceptualization is that any perceived change in stimulation is sufficient to produce an orientation reaction. However, this does not seem very plausible in light of the great variability of the natural environment. A mechanism that produces an orientation to the slightest change in stimulation would not be functional. Indeed, with the accumulation of research data, We thank Yifat Kresh and Ester Bambcrger for their help in the data collection and Irving Biedennan, Ram Frost, John Furedy, and the reviewers for their helpful comments oa an earlier version of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Itamar Gati, Department of Psychology, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem 91905, Israel. more and more instances in which a change in stimulation failed to evoke an OR were reported. For example, Furedy (1968) did not obtain an OR to a change in the order of stimulus presentation. Zimny, Pawlick, and Saur (1969) presented numbers in a serial order. A presentation of an unexpected number (e.g., 21, 22, 23,..., 600) did not produce an enhanced electrodermal response. Houck and Mefferd (1969) obtained a significant increase in electrodermal responsivity to a stimulus change only across but not within stimulus modality. Furthermore, Bernstein (1969) indicated that even in experiments in which a stimulus change did produce an OR, there were marked individual differences, and in many subjects the effect of stimulus change was not observed.
Two solutions have been offered to account for these difficulties in OR theory. Some researchers used the term generalization ofhabituation to indicate that habituation processes may generalize across a whole set of stimuli belonging to a given category (e.g., Ben-Shakhar & Lieblich, 1982a; Connolly & Frith, 1978a; Houck & Mefferd, 1969; Mino & Miyata, 1975) . The concept of generalization of habituation implies that neuronal models may represent stimulus categories rather than individual stimuli; thus a stimulus change within a given category would not be expected to produce an orientation. Similarly, Frith (1978a, 1978b) argued that neuronal models operate within a range of specific limits, so that a single neuronal model represents a whole set of similar stimuli, accounting for a generalization of the habituation within this set. The problem with this line of reasoning is that no clear theory explicating the conditions for generalization ofhabituation has been formulated, and this concept may be used as a post hoc explanation whenever a change in stimulation fails to elicit an OR.
An alternative approach made an even greater departure from the original Sokolovian OR theory. Several investigators (e.g., Bernstein, 1969 Bernstein, , 1979 Maltzman, 1979) argued that novelty (i.e., a change in stimulus input) per se is not a sufficient condition for OR elicitation, and concepts such as significance were postulated as additional and necessary conditions for an OR to be elicited by a change in stimulation.
According to this approach, a novel stimulus will induce an orientation only if the organism perceives it as significant. However, the mechanism for assessing significance and distinguishing between significant and nonsignificant stimuli was not specified, and therefore this concept, too, may be used as a post hoc explanation to account for the failure of a novel stimulus to produce an orientation.
These difficulties are inherent in the Sokolovian approach because although the idea of a match/mismatch mechanism is quite powerful, Sokolov and his followers made no attempt to specify the nature of the matching mechanism. If, indeed, novelty and significance are important for stimulus selection and processing, then there ought to be some mechanism for making distinctions between novel and nonnovel stimuli, as well as between significant and nonsignificant stimuli. In one sense, any event is unique: Even when a specific stimulus is presented repeatedly, there might be slight differences in the stimulus input (e.g., the angle or the distance of the subject from the stimulus may change as a result of slight movements). Clearly, these slight differences are generally ignored, but they indicate that some assessment of stimulus similarity must be made in order to reach decisions regarding stimulus novelty. The notion of stimulus similarity is central to Sokolov's (1963) theory because a mismatch between a stimulus input and a neuronal model is based on a comparison of the two. If OR elicitation is a result of a mismatch decision, then the process of comparing stimulus inputs with existing representations should be specified. Similarly, some comparison between stimulus inputs and representations must be made in order to assess stimulus significance.
Our major objective was to propose a model describing how comparisons between stimulus inputs and activated representations may be carried out in order to evaluate stimuli in terms of their novelty and significance for the organism and how these evaluations are reflected by orientation reactions. We did not intend to propose a general theory for the concept of significance. Rather, we focused on the process of comparing stimulus inputs with representations of significance, a process that, according to the proposed approach, underlies the elicitation of ORs. A basic assumption underlying our approach is that the process of comparing stimulus inputs with stimulus representations is similar to the process that underlies the comparison of two stimuli in order to make similarity judgments. We intended to deal with the question of OR elicitation by introducing a feature-matching definition of both stimulus significance and stimulus novelty. This definition is based on the contrast model proposed by Tversky (1977) to account for judgments of similarity. Our featurematching approach implies that "neuronal models" represent stimulus features (and not only complete stimuli), and therefore habituation occurs at the feature level. This leads to the central prediction that we wished to test in this study: A reduction in responsivity to a novel test stimulus will be observed when subjects are exposed to some of its features in different contexts.
In the contrast model (Tversky, 1977) , each stimulus is characterized by a set of features, and the comparison of stimuli is described as a feature-matching process. According to this model, common features increase similarity, whereas distinctive features (i.e., features that characterize one stimulus but not the other) decrease similarity. The contrast model accounts for observations related to the pattern of similarity judgments in many contexts , 1984 Krantz & Tversky, 1975; Tversky, 1977; Tversky & Gati, 1978 ,1982 . Our adaptation of the contrast model to describe orientation processes rests on the assumption that both stimulus inputs and stimulus representations (neuronal models) can be characterized by sets of features. We further assume that OR elicitation is determined by two independent factors: stimulus novelty and stimulus significance. The assessment of each factor is a function of a separate feature-matching process. We turn now to a detailed description of the proposed model.
The Feature-Matching Model
The proposed model applies to a situation in which a stimulus sequence is presented to the subjects while one or more psychophysiological measures are recorded. Before the stimulus presentation, a specific stimulus (or a set of stimuli) is defined as relevant or significant by any of several procedures (e.g., conditioning or using the subject's name or an object chosen by him or her).
We assume that with the introduction of the relevant stimulus, a representation is formed for that stimulus. This representation may depend on the subject's past experience and on the experimental context. We hypothesize that the subsequent stimulus processing is characterized by two matching processes: The stimulus input is compared with the relevant stimulus representation and with representations of the preceding stimuli (i.e., the activated "neuronal models"). Both comparisons are based on matching the features of the stimulus input with the features of the corresponding activated representations.
The outcome of one matching process is an assessment of the stimulus input in terms of its significance, and the outcome of the other matching process is the assessment of the stimulus input in terms of its novelty. Whereas novelty is negatively related to the degree of match between the input and the activated neuronal models (e.g., Sokolov, 1963) , the level of significance is positively related to the degree of match between the input and the relevant representation. We assume that the outcomes of the two matching processes are then integrated to produce an orientation that is monotonically related to both significance and novelty. Thus the OR reflects both the significance (S) and the novelty (N) parameters. In the following sections, we elaborate and specify the two matching processes that underlie the production of ORs.
Significance
We assume, as did Tversky (1977) , that each stimulus i can be characterized by a set of measurable features, denoted /. The significance factor is based on matching the features of the test stimulus with those of the relevant one. The degree of match is derived from Tversky's contrast model, according to which the match between stimuli i and j, denoted S (i, j) , is a function of three arguments: / n J, the features shared by i and j; I -J, the features of i that do not belong to j; and J -/, the features of j that do not belong to (' :
where S 2 0, a > 0, and 0 a 0.
Thus the model expresses the similarity of i and./ as a linear combination, or contrast, of their common and distinctive features, in which similarity increases with the measure of the common features and decreases with the measure of distinctive features. We assume that the degree of significance is determined by the contrast model (Equation 1). Specifically, the significance of a given stimulus i is represented by S(i, r), where r denotes the relevant stimulus, and 9, a, and (3 are nonnegative constants reflecting the relative weights of the common versus the two sets of distinctive features. and is a negative montomc function of the total number of appearances of features common to i and to the stimuli preceding it in the sequence. Thus a reduction in novelty is determined not just by the number and the measure of nonnovel features but also by the total number of prior exposures of each nonnovel feature. This formulation can be further refined and elaborated (e.g., different weights might be assigned to different features reflecting their salience; distinctions might be introduced between several presentations of a single feature and a single presentation of several features). However, at this primary stage, we focused on testing the fundamental premises of the model: whether habituation occurs at the feature level and whether a reduction in responsivity to a novel test stimulus will be observed when subjects are exposed to some of its features in different contexts.
Novelty
Although the significance factor is derived directly from the contrast model by a comparison of the features of the test stimulus with those of the relevant one, the novelty factor is more complex because it involves a comparison of the test stimulus with a whole set of stimuli: the set of all stimuli that preceded it in the sequence. Two possible alternatives can be formulated for deriving the degree of stimulus novelty on the basis of the proposed feature-matching approach.
According to the first alternative, the features of a test stimulus /, denoted /, are contrasted with the set of features contained in all the stimuli that preceded stimulus i in the sequence. This comparison is based on a classification of the features of i into two inclusive and exhaustive subsets: H and I -H. H refers to all features of; that were included in at least one of the stimuli preceding i in the sequence (habituated features), whereas I -H is the set of all novel features of i (features not included in any of the stimuli preceding i). The novelty factor is defined as a linear combination of the measures of H and I -H, such that where g is a nonnegative scale defined on the relevant collection of features, and y and d are nonnegative constants.
By this formulation, the degree of novelty of stimulus i is positively related to the measure of the unique features of ! and negatively related to the features common to stimulus i and to at least one of the preceding stimuli. According to this alternative, no weight is given to the number of times a given feature has appeared in the stimulus sequence before the test stimulus. Thus this formulation is based on a threshold notion: that a single presentation of any feature of; causes some reduction in the response to /, but further presentations of the same feature do not contribute to an additional reduction in responsivity. This formulation, however, does not seem to fit with the typical habituation process at the stimulus level, which is characterized by a gradual reduction in responsivity with repeated presentations of a stimulus (e.g., Ben-Shakhar, 1980) . Therefore, we propose an alternative formulation: The degree of novelty of the test stimulus; is a positive monotonic function of its novel features (as in the previous formulation)
Integration
We assume that the outcomes of the two comparison processes are integrated to produce an orientation. Specifically, OR = F(S,N), where F is a nonnegative function, 5 refers to the degree of significance, and N refers to the degree of novelty.
The joint effect of novelty and significance in the production of ORs has been the focus of a debate in the literature. Whereas O'Gorman (1979) maintained the traditional Sokolovian view and hypothesized that OR is determined additively by those two factors, Bernstein (1969 Bernstein ( , 1979 hypothesized that some degree of significance is necessary for orientation and that OR is therefore a product of the interaction between novelty and significance. Siddle, O'Gorman, and Wood (1979) manipulated both factors in two experiments and demonstrated that novelty was sufficient to create an orientation. Furthermore, they obtained no interactions between novelty and significance in their experiments. Studies conducted in our laboratory with the Guilty Knowledge Technique (GKT) paradigm (Ben-Shakhar, Asher, PoznanskyLevy, Asherowitz, & Lieblich, 1989; Ben-Shakhar & Lieblich, 1982b; Ben-Shakhar, Lieblich, & Kugelmass, 1982 ) also demonstrated that novelty is sufficient to produce ORs but at the same time indicated that these factors might interact. In addition to testing the proposed feature matching approach, our study was designed to further examine whether novelty and significance interact or whether orientation is additively determined by them.
Our approach is consistent with Ohman's (1979) theory. Ohman suggested that the distinction between signal and nonsignal ORs arises because these two types of stimuli activate the central processing channel through different routes. A nonsignal OR is elicited when no matching representation in short-term memory has been identified, whereas an OR to a signal stimulus is elicited because it matches a memory representation that has been primed as "significant" (Ohman, 1979, p. 445) . The unique aspect of our approach is that in addition to proposing that OR depends on stimulus novelty and significance, we try to specify the nature of the matching processes that determine these factors. In order to achieve this goal, we assume an analysis of the different stimuli in terms of their features or a modification of the Sokolovian theory to deal with stimulus features and their representations.
The significance factor was explored in a previous study (Ben-Shakhar & Gati, 1987) . That study demonstrated that the electrodermal component of the OR depends on common and distinctive features of the test stimulus and the relevant one. Specifically, responsivity increased monotonically with the number of common components and decreased with the number of distinctive components. Therefore, in our study we focused on the effect of the novelty factor and on the joint effect of the two factors. Two experiments were designed to test predictions derived from the proposed model. These experiments are based on the information-detection paradigm used previously by Ben-Shakhar and Gati (1987) and by Gati, Ben-Shakhar, and Oren (1986) , and we used both verbal and pictorial stimuli. In Experiment 1 we focused on the novelty factor and examined systematically whether exposing subjects to some components of a given stimulus would moderate the psychophysiological responsivity to the introduction of that stimulus. In other words, in Experiment 1 we tested predictions regarding habituation at the stimulus-feature level. In Experiment 2 we manipulated both factors (i.e., significance and novelty) in order to examine whether they interact or whether these factors affect OR additively.
Experiment 1
The relationship between electrodermal responsivity and stimulus significance was previously demonstrated (BenShakhar & Gati, 1987) , with a special version of the Guilty Knowledge Technique (Lykken, 1959 (Lykken, , 1960 . In this experiment we focused on the novelty factor of the proposed model. A direct prediction derived from the model is that exposing subjects to some components of a given stimulus would initiate a habituation process that would be reflected in a reduced responsivity to that stimulus, even when it was presented for the first time.
In the initial phase of the experiment, a compound significant stimulus was introduced. Either a schematic face or a verbal description (comprising four components) of a person was presented to the subject, who was told that the person had been the victim of a crime. The subjects were instructed to memorize the relevant stimulus. In the second phase (the polygraph interrogation phase), a sequence of stimuli was presented to the subjects while their skin conductance response (SCR) was continuously measured. This sequence included a test stimulus (which was always identical to the relevant one), which was preceded by several control stimuli, each sharing no, one, two, or three common components with the relevant stimulus. Thus the degree of novelty of the test stimulus was varied by a systematic manipulation of the components that it shared with the control stimuli that preceded it.
Two versions were formulated for deriving the degree of stimulus novelty. The prediction based on the first formulation was that electrodermal responsivity to the test stimuli in the "0" (no-common-component) condition would be greater than the responsivity in all other conditions, which would not differ among themselves. We adopted the second version and predicted that electrodermal responsivity to the relevant stimulus would decrease as a function of the number of exposures of its components in the sequence. In other words, we expected that responsivity to the test stimulus would monotonically decrease with each additional exposure of its components in the control stimuli preceding it.
Method Subjects
One hundred thirty female and 126 male subjects were randomly assigned to eight groups of 32 each; each group was assigned to a different experimental condition. In this experiment (as well as in Experiment 2), the subjects were undergraduate students who received either course credit or payment.
Apparatus
Skin conductance was measured by a constant voltage system (0.5 VASR Atlas Researches). Two Ag/AgCl electrodes (0.8-cm diameter) were used with an electrode paste that consisted of one part physiological saline mixed with two parts of Unibase, according to the recipe provided by Fowles, Christie, Edelberg, Grings. Lykken, and Venables (1981) . The experiment was conducted in an airconditioned laboratory and was monitored from a control room separated from the laboratory by a one-way mirror. A PDF 11/23 computer was used to control the stimulus presentation and to compute skin conductance changes. The pictorial stimuli were projected on a screen by a slide projector placed in the subject's room and controlled by the computer. The verbal stimuli were displayed on a VT100 monitor.
Stimuli
Pictorial stimuli. To enable a comparison with previous studies, the faces and verbal descriptions used in this study were variations of the stimuli used in previous studies (Ben-Shakhar & Gati, 1987; Gati & Tversky, 1984) . The pictorial stimuli were constructed from the basic faces (see Figure 1) . Two additional schematic faces served as the buffer stimuli presented at the outset of each stimulus sequence to control for the initial response. Each face consisted of four separable components that included the basic frame (including eyes, nose, and mouth; a in Table 2 ) and three additive components: beard and mustache (b), hat (c), and glasses (</).
Each of the 11 stimuli in the sequence included all four components. Face Bi (see Figure 1) was always presented at the outset of each stimulus sequence, whereas Face B 2 was always presented on Trials 2 and 7 of the sequence. Both buffer stimuli were fixed under all experimental conditions. One of the other four faces served as the relevant stimulus (each face served as the relevant stimulus for 25% of the subjects in each experimental condition), and the other three faces were used as control stimuli and were manipulated in the following way: 0, 1, 2, or 3 neutral components of each control stimulus were replaced by 0, 1, 2, or 3 components of the relevant stimulus, respectively. The three additive components (b, c, and d) were replaced 1, 2, or 3 times in experimental Conditions 1, 2, and 3, respectively. For example, when a^biCidi was the relevant face, a 2^2<v6 was a typical control stimulus under habituation Condition 0, aikic-idi served as a control stimulus under habituation Condition 1, and a^bzCidi and aib,Cid, were the typical control stimuli in habituation Conditions 2 and 3, respectively. Verbal stimuli. Four sets of verbal descriptions of the "victim" were constructed. Each set included information regarding the occupation (u in Table 2 ) and three additive components: city of residence (6), hobby (c), and a personality trait of the "victim" (d). These four sets of descriptions, as well as the two descriptions that served as buffer stimuli and were fixed under all experimental conditions, are listed in Table 1 .
Procedure
Phase 1-The subjects were seated at a table facing the screen and were told by the experimenter that the aim of the experiment was to examine the accuracy of the polygraph in detecting criminals. The subjects were then told to pretend that they were suspected of taking part in a murder. The face of the "victim of the murder" was projected on a screen facing the subject. After the subjects assured the experimenter that they had memorized the face of the "victim," the general principles of the Guilty Knowledge Technique were explained to them, and they were instructed to try to appear innocent of the "murder charge." In the verbal conditions the victim's description was displayed on a VT100 monitor.
Phase 2. The two electrodes were attached to the volar side of the index and fourth fingers of the subject's left hand with masking tape at a pressure comfortable for the subject. The subjects were requested to sit at ease for a rest period of 2 min to be followed by further instructions. At the end of this 2-min baseline recording period, the subjects were told that a series of slides showing faces or a series of verbal descriptions of people would shortly be presented in front of them. The subjects were requested to sit quietly and watch the stimuli without verbally responding to them. They were asked to try to appear innocent of the murder charge by acting as if they were unfamiliar with the victim's face (the relevant face) or with the victim's description (in the verbal conditions).
A sequence of 11 stimuli was presented to the subjects at random intervals ranging from 16 to 24 s: the mean interstimulus interval was 20 s. Each stimulus was presented for 5 s. The stimulus sequence began with two buffer stimuli (see Figure 1 and Table 1 ) followed by the three control stimuli and then the relevant stimulus (in Trial 6). Each of the five stimuli presented in Trials 2-6 were repeated in Trials 7-11; the second buffer was presented again in Trial 7 and the relevant stimulus in Trial 11.
At the end of the experiment, the subjects were asked to identify their "victim" from four faces of which one was the actual relevant Note, a = the basic face or the occupation; b = the beard and mustache or the city of residence; c = glasses or the hobby; d = hat or personality trait. Subscripts i, /, k, and / denote the four possible variations of each component (e.g., the four basic faces, the four types of glasses). Each variation was included in the relevant stimulus for 25% of the subjects.
face and three were control faces presented with it. In the verbal conditions, the subjects were asked to recall the victim's description. The data from the few subjects (less than 2%) who failed to identify the actual relevant face or to recall the victim's description were discarded and were replaced by data from other subjects in this and the next experiment. Finally, the subjects were debriefed and paid.
Design
The design of the relevant and control stimuli is presented in Table  2 . We manipulated the components of the control stimuli in the four experimental conditions by substituting components:
Condition 0. None of the components of the relevant stimulus were included in the control stimuli preceding it.
Condition 1. In each of the three control stimuli, 1 component was replaced by the respective component of the relevant stimulus. In each control stimulus, a different component was replaced.
Condition 2. In each of the three control stimuli, 2 components were replaced by the respective components of the relevant stimulus. In each control stimulus, two different components were replaced.
Condition 3. In each of the three control stimuli, all 3 additive components were replaced by the respective components of the relevant stimulus.
Thus each of the three control stimuli included 1, 2, or 3 relevant components in Conditions 1, 2, and 3, respectively. They included no relevant component in Condition 0. Each of the four faces or descriptions served as the relevant stimulus for 25% of the subjects in each experimental condition, whereas the components of the other three stimuli served to construct the control stimuli for those subjects.
Data Analysis
Subjects' responses were transmitted in real time to the PDF 11/ 23 system. We computed the maximal conductance change obtained from the subject, from 1 s after stimulus onset through 5 s after stimulus onset, by using an A/D converter with a sampling rate of 20 per second.
In our previous experiments (e.g., Ben-Shakhar & Gati, 1987) , we used a within-subjects standardization of the SCRs to eliminate individual differences in responsivity and to enable a meaningful summation of responses of different subjects. It was impossible to use such a transformation in the present experiment because the control stimuli were manipulated and hence were not standard across the different experimental conditions. Thus any ipsative measure based on the responses to the control stimuli might introduce a confounding factor. (A larger mean standardized response to the relevant stimulus in one condition could mean that the response to the relevant stimulus in that condition was indeed larger, but it could also mean that the responses to the control stimuli in that condition tended to be smaller.) It was therefore necessary to define another measure of relative response to the relevant stimulus, a measure that would not depend on the responses to the control stimuli that were manipulated. Except for the relevant stimulus (which was presented twice in the sequence), there were two stimuli unaffected by the experimental manipulation: the buffer stimuli that were presented in Trials 1, 2, and 7 of the stimulus sequence. A set of five responses did not seem to be sufficient for standardization, and therefore the Paintal transformation was used instead (Lykken, Rose, Luther, & Maley, 1966) : The SCR to each test stimulus was divided by the maximal response evoked from the five stimuli that remained constant across experimental conditions.
Results
The transformed responses to the test stimulus revealed a marked habituation from its initial presentation in Trial 6 to its second presentation in Trial 11. Furthermore, in some The transformed SCRs to the first presentation of the test stimulus were averaged across subjects in each experimental condition (see Table 3 ).
A two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was carried out on the mean transformed responses to the relevant test stimuli to compare the eight experimental conditions. Significant main effects were obtained both for novelty, F(3, 248) = 2.96, and for stimulus modality, F(l, 248) = 8.94 (MS, = 0.12).
No significant interaction was obtained, F(3, 248) = 1.41.
Table 3 Means and Standard Deviations of the Transformed Responses to the First Presentation of the Relevant Stimulus in Experiment 1
No. of relevant components included A linear trend analysis was conducted on the level of novelty (0, 1, 2, or 3) on the basis of the pooled data (across verbal and pictorial stimuli). The linearity hypothesis was not rejected, F(l, 252) = 0.50, and the linear slope was significantly smaller than 0, F(\, 252) = 7.61 (MS, = 0.14). In order to examine further the differences between the experimental conditions, three planned contrasts were computed. The critical stimulus produced significantly larger responsivity (with a one-tailed t test) in Condition 0 than in all other conditions, t(248) = 1.73. It produced significantly larger responses in Condition 1 than in Conditions 2 and 3, r(248) = 1.88); and it produced larger responsivity in Condition 2 than in Condition 3, f(248) = 1.79. In order to examine whether the test stimulus produced an enhanced responsivity within each experimental condition, the SCRs to the relevant test stimulus were compared with the immediately preceding stimulus by a matched-groups t test. The observed 1(63) values were 3.78,5.06,3.58, and 1.76 in Conditions 0, 1,2, and 3, respectively. These results indicate that the average response to the test stimulus exceeded that of the preceding stimulus.
The design of Experiment 1 allowed for a further examination of the significance factor. This was possible through a comparison of the responses to the control stimuli in the four experimental conditions. The mean transformed responses to the first control stimulus (the third stimulus in the sequence) were 0.32, 0.48, 0.69, and 0.73 in Conditions 0, 1, 2, and 3, respectively. A two-way ANOVA revealed that this effect was significant, F(3, 248) = 2.88 (MS, = 0.82), which indicates that the response to the control stimulus increased monotonically with the number of relevant components. Neither a significant main effect for stimulus modality, F(l, 248) = 1.81, nor a significant interaction, F(3, 248) = 0.65, was obtained in this analysis. Table 3 reveals a general monotonic decrease in the relative responsivity to the relevant stimulus when subjects were exposed to some of its components before its initial presentation. The larger the number of exposures to relevant components, the greater the reduction in responsivity that was observed. A complete monotonic relationship was maintained only across modes of stimulus presentation, whereas one deviation from monotonicity was observed within each mode. Because these deviations are unsystematic, we believe that they reflect random fluctuations that can be attributed to the rather weak manipulation of the habituation factor that we used in this experiment. In the next experiment, the effect of habituating stimulus components was replicated in a stronger manipulation.
Discussion
Our results are compatible with the proposed model, according to which novelty is measured by matching of the features of the test stimulus with the set of all features presented in at least one of the stimuli preceding the test stimulus. Furthermore, the first version (the threshold version) of the model was not supported by the results because the responses to the relevant stimulus tended to be monotonically related to the total number of exposures to relevant features. In addition, the significant effects for all three contrasts examined indicate that more exposures of a given feature contribute to a further reduction in responsivity, beyond that which resulted from the first exposure. However, this does not necessarily mean that each exposure of each component is registered. It is possible that habituation is determined just by the number of components exposed before the presentation of the relevant stimulus, but the probability of correctly recognizing a relevant component that was presented is a function of the number of its exposures. These findings are compatible with the suggestion of Ben-Shakhar and Lieblich (1982b) , who accounted for generalization of habituation from neutral to relevant stimuli in terms of their common components. According to Table 3 , it seems that most of the reduction in responsivity occurred between Condition 2 and Condition 3. This might be attributed to the fact that only in Condition 3 had all three additive components been presented in all preceding control stimuli, which resulted perhaps in habituation to the "gestalf in addition to the habituation of individual components.
The within-condition t tests indicate a clear enhanced responsivity to the test stimulus in Conditions 0, 1, and 2. Although the test stimulus produced a greater responsivity than did the preceding stimulus in Condition 3 as well, the effect was smaller. This finding reflects both (a) a decreased responsivity to the test stimulus that shared more common components with the preceding control stimulus and (b) an increased responsivity to the control stimuli that in these experimental conditions shared more components with the relevant stimulus.
Two implications can be drawn from the results of Experiment 1: (a) Habituation of the OR may occur even for a stimulus that is presented for the first time, provided that the subjects had been exposed to some of its components. This is, in fact, a description of the generalization of habituation phenomenon, (b) Generalization of habituation across a set of stimuli is determined by the common and distinctive features of the different stimuli in the set. A large measure of commonality results in a rapid process of generalization, whereas many distinctive features (features contained in one stimulus but not in any of the others) would slow down this process.
In addition, Experiment 1 demonstrated once again the validity of the proposed model with respect to the significance factor. We showed that the response to the control stimulus is a monotonically increasing function of the number of relevant components it includes. This finding replicated previous observations (Ben-Shakhar & Gati, 1987) .
Experiment 2
Ben-Shakhar and Gati (1987) demonstrated that the responsivity to a test stimulus is an increasing function of its match to the relevant stimulus. Experiment 1 demonstrated that responsivity to a test stimulus is a decreasing function of its match to the set of stimuli preceding it in the sequence. These findings support our hypotheses that skin conductance responsivity reflects both novelty and significance. In Experiment 2 we explored the joint contribution of these two factors by simultaneously manipulating them. This design allowed for an examination of a possible interaction between these factors and may shed additional light on the controversy between Bernstein (1979) , who postulated that ORs are determined by the interaction between novelty and significance, and O' Gorman (1979) , who postulated that the contribution of these factors is additive.
Method Subjects
One hundred thirty-eight female and 102 male students were randomly assigned to eight groups of 30 each.
Stimuli
The same set of schematic faces used in Experiment 1 served as stimuli. However, an additional additive component, a pipe, was added to each of the faces, (see Figure 2) . The verbal descriptions were the same as those used in Experiment 1, with an additional additive component: native country. The stimulus sequence began with a single buffer stimulus, followed by four control stimuli and then the test stimulus,
Design
We used a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design, as both novelty and significance were manipulated in each stimulus modality. Specifically, we used two levels of novelty: a high-novelty level, in which none of the relevant components was included in the control stimuli preceding the test stimulus, and a low-novelty level, in which each of the four control stimuli contained three of five possible relevant components. Two levels of significance of the test stimulus were used. In the highsignificance condition, the test stimulus was identical to the relevant one, whereas in the low-significance condition, two components of the relevant stimulus were replaced by two appropriate neutral components (see Table 4 ).
Procedure
The apparatus and the procedure were identical to those used in Experiment 1.
Data Analysis
The SCRs were defined and computed in the same way as in Experiment 1. Because in this experiment, as in the previous one, the control stimuli were manipulated, we used a transformation similar to that we used in Experiment 1 (i.e., dividing each SCR by the maximal SCR evoked by the three stimuli that were fixed across experimental conditions).
Results
The transformed responses to the first presentation of the test stimulus (in Trial 6) were averaged across subjects in each experimental condition (see Table 5 ). The transformed re- Note. The relevant stimulus was a,bf4ie, for all four experimental conditions, a denotes the basic face or occupation. In the low-significance condition (S = 3), the hat and the pipe (i.e., d and e) were replaced in the pictorial conditions and the hobby and the personality trait in the verbal condition for half of the subjects, whereas the beard and the glasses (i.e., b and c) were replaced in the pictorial conditions and native country and city of residence in the verbal conditions for the other half. Subscripts i,}. k, I, m, and n denote the six possible variations of each component.
sponses were subjected to a three-way ANOVA. All three main effects were significant: The test stimulus produced larger responsivity in the high-novelty condition (0) than in the lownovelty condition (3), F(l, 232) = 15.53 (MS, = 0.14); test stimuli that were identical to the relevant one produced larger responsivity than did those sharing only three components with it, F(l, 232) = 7.73; and verbal mode of stimulus presentation produced larger responsivity than did the pictorial mode, F(l, 232) = 13.71. None of the interaction effects were statistically significant (Fs < 1). The proportion of the variance accounted for by the two-way interaction between the novelty and significance was 0.025% (the proportion of variance accounted for by all the effects was 13.85%).
As in Experiment 1, the SCRs for the test stimuli exceeded those elicited by the preceding stimuli. The observed matchedgroups t tests were statistically significant in three experimental conditions: i(59) = 4.05 (S = 5, H = 0); J(59) = 2.58 (S = 3, H = 0); and «(S9) = 2.59 (S = 5, H = 3). In the fourth condition, with low significance (S = 3) and high habituation (H = 3), the difference was positive but not significant (( = 0.46).
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 replicated those of Experiment 1 and those of Ben-Shakhar and Gati (1987) and revealed the effects of both novelty and significance. Habituation of components decreased responsivity, whereas increasing the distinction between the test stimulus and the relevant one decreased responsivity. These findings are compatible with the proposed model, according to which responsivity is an increasing function of the degree to which a test stimulus matches the relevant one but is a decreasing function of the commonality between a test stimulus and the stimuli that preceded it.
The present results revealed no evidence for an interaction between significance and novelty. This finding may be interpreted as supporting O'Gorman's (1979) view that the effects of the two factors are additive. This interpretation is based not only on the fact that the interaction failed to produce a significant effect but also on the extremely small magnitude of this effect. Thus the findings are compatible with the hypothesis that each of the two factors has a unique and independent effect on the electrodermal responsivity. Furthermore, it is compatible with previous results reported by Siddle et al. (1979) , who examined the joint effects of novelty and significance on the electrodermal measure of the OR and obtained only main effects. They concluded that stimulus change is sufficient for an OR, and that the relation between novelty and significance is additive.
General Discussion
The results of our experiments provided empirical support for the proposed feature-matching model. We demonstrated that stimulus significance and novelty can be manipulated by the changing of stimulus components and that these manipulations affect orientation reactions in a predictable manner. The importance of the proposed model does not lie in its introduction of stimulus novelty and significance as the basic factors determining orientation and habituation, insofar as these effects have been demonstrated before (e.g., Bernstein, 1979 Bernstein, , 1981 Bernstein & Taylor, 1979; Siddle et al., 1979; van Olst, Heemstra, & ten Kortenaar, 1979) . Rather, the importance of the proposed model stems from the specification, in terms of a feature analysis of the stimuli, of the matching processes that are postulated to underlie the assessment of novelty and significance. Specifically, any stimulus input has a variable degree of novelty based on the degree to which it matches the stimulus set that preceded it in the given context, and its significance is measured by the degree to which the stimulus input matches the representation of the relevant information.
The proposed model can be viewed as an elaboration and an extention of Sokolov's (1963 Sokolov's ( , 1966 theory. Sokolov proposed that stimulus novelty is defined by the matching of a stimulus input with a central representation of information that has already been processed (neuronal models). In our proposed model, we extend this general idea in two directions: (a) we propose an algorithm through which this matching process might be executed, and (b) we suggest that stimulus significance is also determined by the matching of an input with a central representation. However, in the case of significance, responsivity does not increase as a function of the mismatch between input and representation; rather, it increases with the degree to which the stimulus input does match representations of significant stimuli.
Thus according to the proposed model, both stimulus significance and novelty operate through separate but similar mechanisms. Each input is evaluated for both significance and novelty through different matching processes that jointly determine orientation. In our model, in contrast to Bernstein's (1969 Bernstein's ( , 1979 proposal, we do not assume that significance is a necessary condition for OR elicitation to stimulus change. At the same time, our approach accounts for many of the observations that led Bernstein to his conclusions. Orientation is not evoked by very slight changes in the environment, and, as the results of both experiments indicate, whenever the commonality of the incoming information and the representations activated by preceding stimulus input is large, responsivity might be significantly attenuated. Furthermore, this might also be true for a stimulus input that has not yet been presented (i.e., a novel stimulus), provided that many of its features have been. According to this approach, generalization of habituation occurs whenever a stimulus set has many common features and each stimulus in the set is characterized by very few distinctive features. The likelihood of orientation is a monotonically increasing function of the measure of novel and relevant features of the input stimulus (which makes sense from the functional point of view).
Our approach may also resolve some of the contradictions and disputes in the OR literature. According to the proposed feature-matching model, an OR to a nonsignificant stimulus is possible if that stimulus has enough novel features. For example, Ben-Shakhar et al. (1989) demonstrated that an SCR increase to a nonsignificant stimulus change occurred when the test stimulus followed a simple stimulus sequence (a repetition of a single standard stimulus), but not when it was preceded by a complex sequence (a sequence of varying standard stimuli).
Similarly, a nonsignificant test stimulus elicits orientation only when it is introduced relatively late in the stimulus sequence (Ben-Shakhar etal., 1989; Edwards, 1975; Magliero, Gatchel, & Lojewski, 1981) . A significant test stimulus, on the other hand, elicits enhanced electrodermal responsivity irrespective of its serial position and is less dependent on the nature of the preceding stimulus sequence (e.g., Ben-Shakhar et al., 1989) . These observations are compatible with our model, according to which novelty is determined by the contrast between the test stimulus and the stimulus set preceding it, whereas responsivity to a significant test stimulus is less dependent on the preceding stimuli. According to our approach, the failure of many experiments to elicit an OR to a nonsignificant test stimulus does not indicate that significance is a necessary condition for OR elicitation, insofar as this failure may result from insufficient contrast or from a large commonality between the test stimulus and the sequence preceding it. Responsivity to a significant test stimulus is not determined by only its novelty value, and this fact seems to account for the finding that this type of responsivity is relatively independent of the nature of the stimulus sequence preceding the test stimulus.
The two factors that determine OR according the proposed model may correspond to the two types of OR mentioned by Maltzman and his colleagues (e.g., Maltzman, Gould, Pendry, & Wolff, 1982; Maltzman, Vincent, & Wolff, 1982) . They made a distinction between voluntary and involuntary ORs: The latter is evoked by an unexpected novel stimulus, whereas the former reflects a response to a predictable stimulus-a stimulus for which expectations have been formed through instructions. A similar distinction was made by Naatanen (1979) , who noted that Sokolov's (1963) original theory cannot account for the activation of the OR by familiar but significant stimuli. Naatanen proposed using the term orienting reflex to describe the involuntary organismic response evoked by novel stimuli and reserving the term orienting reaction for longer latency, less automatic orienting responses.
In both experiments, we used a modified version of the Guilty Knowledge Technique paradigm. Our results are therefore particularly relevant for understanding the phenomenon of psychophysiological detection of information within this paradigm. Previous attempts to account for psychophysiological detection within OR theory led to the proposal of the dichotomization theory, which postulated independent habituation processes for the relevant and the neutral stimuli (e.g., Ben-Shakhar, 1977; Ben-Shakhar, Lieblich, & Kugelmass, 1975; Lieblich, Kugelmass, & Ben-Shakhar, 1970) . The present approach is a more general formulation than the dichotomization model, and it can account for some findings that contradict the dichotomization theory (e.g., Ben-Shakhar et al., 1989; Ben-Shakhar & Lieblich, 1982b) .
In contrast to the dichotomization theory, which was based on a clear distinction between the two classes of stimuli, the present model treats significance as a continuous dimension and assigns each stimulus some value along this dimension. Consequently, it is impossible to assume two independent processes of habituation to relevant and neutral stimuli. Rather, the generalization of habituation from one stimulus category to another depends on the number of common and distinctive features of the two categories. Thus when the categories are relatively distinct and have little commonality, there will be a small amount of generalization across them and hence the dichotomization model will fit the data relatively well. For example, Ben-Shakhar and Lieblich (1982b) used a sequence of card numbers as their stimuli. The relevant stimulus was a card number chosen by the subject and therefore had a great deal of commonality with the neutral stimuli (all were one-digit numbers). On the other hand, Ben-Shakhar et al. (1989) used descriptions of persons as their stimuli and used a relevant stimulus that had a novel distinctive component not shared by any of the other stimuli (the name of a hobby). Indeed, the results of the latter experiment were in line with the dichotomization model and revealed no serial position effect for the relevant stimulus, whereas the results of the former study contradicted the dichotomization model by showing a clear serial position effect.
Finally, we note some qualifications. Our model is not an attempt to describe how significance is originally formed; rather, it is a description of how new input is compared with existing representations of significance. Our proposed model is applicable to a situation in which the significance of the test stimulus was established before the presentation of the stimulus sequence. This can be done either by instructions (e.g., to choose a specific object, or to pay attention to certain stimuli and not to others) or by some prior experience (e.g., a conditioning procedure). In these situations, the subject expects the significant stimulus to appear in the stimulus sequence, its appearance comes with no surprise, and the enhanced response evoked by it cannot be assumed to reflect novelty, surprise, or mismatch between stimulus input and expectations. There are, however, other instances in which significant stimuli might occur without prior expectations (i.e., when there is no clear representation of the significant event in mind). Clearly, our model was not designed to deal with those situations because there is no representation to match the input with. Perhaps the autonomic responsivity that characterizes these situations falls under the category of a defensive reflex (e.g., Sokolov, 1963) . Similarly, our model does not attempt to deal with subjective or spontaneous significance (e.g., Bernstein, 1979) .
Our study constitutes a first attempt to examine the proposed feature-matching model. Many questions require further research. First, the specification of the novelty factor needs farther clarification. The results of Experiment 1 demonstrate that responsivity tends to decrease monotonically with the number of exposures of each feature. The exact shape of this function is not clear. Habituation functions at the stimulus level tend to display a negative exponential pattern (Ben-Shakhar, 1980; Ben-Shakhar et al., 1975) . If this is true for the feature level as well, then a single exposure of many different features would affect habituation more than many exposures of a particular stimulus feature. Different features might have differential effects on the habituation process, depending on their salience and on their position in the stimulus sequence (e.g., recency effects).
The proposed feature-matching approach, which is based on the contrast model (Tversky, 1977) , depends on several parameters (see Equations 1 and 2). The assessment of both factors (novelty and significance) is determined by a contrast of the common and the distinctive features of the input with the respective representations. However, the relative weights of the two types of features have to be estimated separately for novelty and significance. Our study was not designed to distinguish between the effects of common and of distinctive features, and this is left for future research. Such a study may not only contribute by validating our model but may also deepen our understanding of the information processes involved in the GKT paradigm.
Furthermore, in our model we assumed that only one class of distinctive features takes part in determining the novelty parameter: novel features, which are part of the test stimulus but were absent from the stimulus set preceding it. A second type of distinctive features-those included in some stimuli of the sequence but not in the test stimulus itself-might also play a role in determining the novelty factor and the amount of orientation. These two types of distinctive features might have different weights and different impacts on the evaluation of novelty and on the orientation processes. Such an asymmetry was already demonstrated with relation to the significance factor (Ben-Shakhar & Gati, 1987) .
Another factor that should be incorporated into our featurematching approach is the weight of the features that do not belong to any particular stimulus but rather characterize the stimulus sequence. Examples for such emergent features are (a) particular orderings of the stimuli that constitute the sequence and (b) particular patterns of the interstimulus intervals. Once a representation for such features has been created, they may operate just like stimulus features. Thus a change in stimulus order may contribute to the novelty factor because the stimulus input does not match the representation of the sequence, even if no novel features were introduced at the stimulus level. Effects of changing the order of stimuli within a sequence on the OR were reported by some researchers (e.g., Berlyne, 1961) , although there have been instances in which this effect was not obtained (e.g., Furedy, 1968) .
Additional questions regarding the integration of the two factors may be raised. The lack of interaction between novelty and significance suggests that each of these two factors has an independent contribution in the OR elicitation process, but their relative weights need to be determined. In Experiment 2, the observed effect of novelty seemed to be larger than the effect of significance. However, this finding is based on a particular manipulation of novelty and significance. It is possible that different manipulations of the two factors will result in a different pattern of responsivity.
All these questions need further experimentation, the results of which may require modifications and extensions of the proposed model. Indeed, its potential in raising questions may be as important as its contribution in clarifying issues that were raised by previous research. Finally, we believe that this study is an additional instance of the fruitful interaction between the congitive and psychophysiologica] viewpoints in the study of human information processing.
